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Abstract:  
 
The system of copyright offers more than contemporary perceptions would have 
us believe. Embedded within its design of control are ethical measures which 
enhance creative liberty. Properly handled, such measures facilitate the use, and 
protection, of the common stock of knowledge. This paper examines the 
intricacies of copyright via the contribution of Harold A. Innis (1894-1952). His 
expertise with communication, economics, and the law touch the very ambit of 
copyright. His passion for creating an atmosphere conducive to individual 
creative liberty has direct relevance to the goals of copyright. Copyright is 
deemed to function as the means to encourage both creativity and respect for 
individuality. The late James Carey (1934-2006) said, “Innis’ books . . . are not 
merely things to read, but things to think with” (Carey, 1981: 73). Innis’ ideas, 
particularly his belief that creativity is fostered through the interaction of 
mainstream thinking with conditions wrought by life in the periphery, show 
themselves not only in the construction of Canadian copyright law, but in recent 
interpretation as well. 
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Résumé: 
 
Le système des droits d’auteur offre plus que les perceptions contemporaines nous 
laissent croire. Intégrées dans le modèle de contrôle sont des mesures éthiques qui 
améliorent la liberté créative. Manipulées correctement, ces mesures facilitent 
l’utilisation et la protection de la provision commune de la connaissance. Cet 
article examine les subtilités des droits d’auteur via la contribution de Harold A. 
Innis (1894-1952). Son expertise dans le domaine de la communication, de 
l’économie et de la loi touche l’étendue des droits d’auteurs et sa passion pour 
créer une atmosphère conductrice à la liberté créative individuelle a une 
pertinence directe aux objectifs des droits d’auteur. On considère que les droits 
d’auteurs fonctionnent comme des moyens d’encourager la créativité ainsi que le 
respect de l’individualité. Le défunt James Carey (1934-2006) a dit: “Innis’ books 
. . . are not merely things to read, but things to think with” (Carey, 1981: 73). Les 
idées d’Innis, particulièrement sa croyance que la créativité est nourrie à travers 
l’interaction entre la pensée populaire et les conditions façonnées par la vie dans 
la périphérie, sont présentes non seulement dans la construction du droit d’auteur 
canadien, mais aussi dans les interprétations récentes.  
 
Mots-clés:  Innis; Droits d’auteur; Traitement Équitable; Droits Moraux; Loi 
Civile; Éthiques 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper explores the ethical relationships inherent to Canada’s Copyright Act through the 
writings of Harold Adams Innis (1894-1952). Although Innis did not explore the subject of 
copyright in detail
1 his writings offer a refreshing point of entry into what is fast becoming a 
jaded and intractable debate. Copyright is deemed to function as the means to encourage both 
creativity and respect for individuality. Canada continues to wrestle with the intricacies of 
reconciling these dual goals amidst geopolitical constraints. 
An obstacle impeding progress is the deep-seated belief that all is different now, that 
digital works and world wide networks have rendered our Copyright Act inert. Such is not the 
case; the Act is media neutral. It is true that the Act does not address specific circumstances of 
digital file movement. It is equally true that judiciaries routinely have wrestled with questions of 
unanticipated usage of copyrighted material with, or without, the advent of new technology. A 
case in point being Harriet Beecher Stowe’s action in 1853 regarding unauthorized translation of 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, (Vaidhyanathan, 2001: 48-50). The charge reflected not a concern over 
technology, but of ethics. 
To discover where ethical issues appear within the mandate of copyright, this paper 
begins by probing Innis’ own ethical stance. It provides a brief look at his legal scholarship, 
particularly Innis’ emphasis upon diversity in law. Common law and civil law both have 
implications for copyright. Bijural Canada is a well placed site of study as is shown here. The Copyright and Ethics: An Innisian Exploration  25
theme of diversity continues through this paper, where attention is brought to the temporal and 
spatial components of the Copyright Act. The paper concludes with one more look to Innis: his 
feelings regarding the Empire offer insight to the empire of copyright and the implications for 
civilization. 
Catherine Frost reveals Innis’ preoccupation with, “what constitutes a good civilization” 
(Frost, 2003: 13). Innis’ lifetime of scholarship followed a poignant question, how are 
civilizations to remain civil? Innis’ definitive biographer, Alexander Watson, demonstrates this 
dimension of Innis’ work and personality.
2 Innis’ question of civility was not an esoteric inquiry, 
but shaped by his vision of Canada as an autonomous nation. Innis desired that individual 
Canadians reach their full potential in self-development and creative expression. The weight he 
felt of the task at hand, to see such a vision come to fruition, is best read from his own words and 
supported by one of his peers. From Innis’ MA thesis, written in the closing days of World War 
I:  
 
It is no occasion for faintheartedness but in the name of those who have fallen in 
the defense of the liberties of the country and in obligation to those who have 
returned from that struggle, the Canadian people have before them the task of 
presenting to the world, a nation morally and materially great, a monument 
worthy of the men living and dead who have made this possible. 
 (Innis, 1918: 20)  
 
Following Innis’ death in 1953, Alexander Brady wrote:  
 
The violent years of the Second World War awakened in him, as in many 
thoughtful people, fundamental questions about the nature of contemporary 
civilization and the special factors which shaped it and were likely to determine 
its fate . . . [Innis] had early come to cherish individuality, and was anxious above 
all that individuals should not be pushed around by public authorities, powerful 
corporations, or ecclesiastical sovereigns. 
 (Brady, 1953: 92-93)  
 
By retaining civility across Western civilization, not only would Canadian interests be better 
served, but the civilization itself would extend its duration by respecting the diversity of those 
cultures found at its periphery or, as some might say, the margins (Innis, 2003e). Civility shows 
itself as a conscious respect for individual liberty, allowing each individual the opportunity for 
betterment. The challenge lies in affording respect for each, with respect for all, with creativity 
itself hanging upon the outcome.  
This same challenge lies at the heart of copyright dispute. Advocates for lesser 
restrictions via copyright argue that creativity will be undermined if the stock of human 
knowledge is strictly controlled. The implication being that it is in society’s best interests to 
ensure some measures exist by which others can freely partake of copyrighted work. The 
converse argument states that without stronger copyright control, creators will not have sufficient 
incentive to engage in creative activity, which is ultimately to the detriment of society. Setting 
apart any consideration of society’s wellbeing, and beginning with Innis’ concern for the 
individual, where does copyright assist or detract with the goal of allowing each individual to 
best exploit his or her creative potential? Meera Nair  26
 
Innis and the Law: A Brief Look 
 
Innis’ writings have been utilized in explorations of aesthetics, antiquity, economics, feminist 
studies, Marxism, media technology, modernism, postmodernism, political economy, public 
policy, and systems theory.
3 However, few scholars have examined Innis’ interest in law. As 
with most of Innis’ writings his rationale is obliquely stated with supporting evidence flung 
across a myriad of essays. A key element though, can be distilled from one cryptic remark: law 
was found, not made . . . 
 
In France and particularly England the weakness of the written tradition favoured 
the position of custom and the common law. Law was found, not made, and the 
implications were evident in the jury system, the King’s Court, common law, and 
parliament. 
 (Innis, 2003b: 21)  
 
That Innis should have felt fondly towards common law, with its antecedent oral tradition, comes 
as no surprise. But to rest here would be premature; it denies the greater importance of Innis’ 
legal studies, namely his appreciation for diversity in law and his regard for the rule of law. 
“Innis viewed the rule of law as one of the highest achievements in Western civilization” 
(Watson, 1981: 563; Watson, 2006: 387). A comprehensive exposition of Innis’ writings 
concerning the development of law is best left for a paper in its own right. Nevertheless, for 
present purposes, existing scholarship in this area requires some mention. Without recourse to 
Watson’s work, each operating independently, William Christian (1980), Richard Noble (1999), 
and William Pencak (2005) share a common conclusion: for Innis, the development of law 
contributed significantly to Canada’s potential as a site of innovation and autonomy.  
Christian edited Innis’ Idea File, and included within the finished publication Innis’ 
unpublished notes on law. These notes served as a basis for the only composition of Innis’ that 
directly addressed the law, Roman Law and the British Empire (Innis, 2004).
4 Of the Idea File, 
Christian writes, “The reader of the slightly fewer than 1500 notes will have an easier time once 
he realizes that concern for the dignity and the freedom of the individual lies at the heart of 
almost every note” (Innis, 1980: xvi). Pencak identifies the importance of diversity in law for 
Innis; and for Innis, freedom was the essential element to attain diversity. Common law allows 
for human activity to shape the development of law itself, and is a necessary complement to the 
more static workings of civil law. The distinction between the two legal regimes lies in the form 
of their development. Common law begins from practice; civil law asserts legitimacy through 
principle. Innis’ call to preserve the tradition of common law in Canada (Innis, 2004) was to 
ensure Canadian unity through respect for diversity. Canada, comprised as it is of regions with 
differing cultural makeup, yields to cohesion by taking into consideration local custom through 
common law. This was a critical component of Innis’ Canadian project (Pencak, 2005: 212). 
Pencak identifies Innis’ interest in multiple legal perspectives and draws the conclusion 
of their benefit to individual freedom. His conclusion pairs well with the work of Noble, who 
begins with Innis’ conception of freedom and leads to Innis’ calls to preserve Canada’s cultural 
and political institutions, particularly those, like common law, that maintain the oral tradition 
(Noble, 1999: 31-34). Noble specifically disclaims the notion that he reconstructs Innis’ Copyright and Ethics: An Innisian Exploration  27
intellectual context; instead, his reading of Innis “illuminates Innis’ political thought” (Ibid: 44). 
Herein lies the crux of understanding Innis. 
Noble traces Innis’ views on freedom to the eighteenth-century Whig tradition as 
espoused by David Hume, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke – individual liberty meant a realm 
of non-interference, guaranteed by the rule of law, and applicable to all. Liberty was not license 
to do as one pleases, but instead the assurance of protection from the arbitrary will of another. 
Non-interference was necessarily reconciled with some measure of social order. Reconciliation 
took form through customs that had evolved gradually over time, thus mitigating the likelihood 
of emotional considerations. One aspect of Noble’s analysis that is particularly relevant to the 
copyright debate is Innis’ appreciation for the circumscribing of emotion by reason. By paying 
close attention to Burke and Hume, beyond any references provided by Innis, Noble uncovers the 
roots of the Innisian couplet:
5
 
Men are qualified for civil liberty, in exact proportion to their disposition to put 
moral chains upon their appetites. 
 (Burke [1881], cited in Noble, 1999: 32)  
 
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly 
impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not the 
conclusions of our reason. 
 (Hume [1745], cited in Noble, 1999: 33)  
 
Moral restraint induces observation of the law, but the question remains, what is morality and 
who defines it? Innis does not answer this question. He pursues a framework of legal evolution 
such that the well-being of the individual is secured from manipulation. If the law is derived 
from customs and traditions which evolve over time, individuals are less exposed to the tyranny 
of immediacy where morality is invoked in the interests of the elite. In our contested 
environment of copyright, the frequent calls to respect intellectual property rights come to mind. 
It is all too easy to frame an incursion into copyrighted work as a violation of a property right. 
Such behaviour is deemed evidence of a lack of morality. Outrage
 conveniently cloaks the reality 
that copyright is not, and has never been, a grant of absolute control. This time-honoured custom 
began with the construction of the law itself.  
Copyright does not protect all and sundry; facts and ideas are never protected. The 
statutory grant of protection applies only to the original expression of an idea. The textbook 
example of this distinction is, almost always, Romeo and Juliet and West Side Story. Even if both 
works had been created at the same time, copyright law as we know it would recognize each 
work as an original expression and worthy of protection. Nevertheless, the protection is not 
permanent, nor absolute. The duration of copyright, roughly speaking, is the lifetime of the 
creator plus fifty years. During this time, copyright can only exclude use of a creative work when 
such use involves reproduction of a substantial aspect of the work. Consistent with the 
indeterminate nature of creativity “substantial” is not defined within the Copyright Act. It is 
decided by the particularities of each situation. And the final opening in the mantle of copyright 
lies with statutory exceptions that allow some uses of copyrighted work, partial or in entirety, 
during the term of protection, when certain conditions are met. 
Sparse as inquiries concerning Innis and the law are, the conjoined terrain of Innis and 
copyright law is even more barren. Two explicit connections exist, but firmly set upon Innis’ Meera Nair  28
reputation as a political economist and a communications historian. Harry Chartrand recognizes 
copyright as a staple of the knowledge economy and reminds us of Innis’ work depicting staples 
as “[engendering] a particular pattern to the economy” (Chartrand, 2006: xv). Ronald Bettig 
explores the history of copyright law “with the systems approach to the history of 
communication pioneered by Harold Innis” (Bettig, 1996: 3). The overlap of copyright law with 
Innis’ writings is much broader than these passing references would suggest. Interestingly 
though, both Bettig and Chartrand open the door to wider possibilities. With respect to various 
revised approaches of explorations by Innis and others, Bettig writes, “these approaches do not 
entirely dispense with notions of determination . . . but do disinherit the claim that determination 
operates only in one direction or in every instance. They resurrect dialectical analysis while 
recognizing the efficacy of ideology and culture” (Ibid: 11). This melds with Chartrand’s 
observation that, “Just as language structures human thought, law structures attitudes and 
behaviour contributing to the ethos or distinctiveness of a culture” (Chartrand, 2006: xii). Taken 
together, law is a medium that structures, and is structured by, the cultural inclinations of the 
society in which it exists. 
To position the law as a medium might invite curiosity, complaint, or perhaps both. 
While Innis himself allows for a broad interpretation of medium, admitting mathematics to the 
realm, (Innis, 2007: 88), the challenge for would-be Innis interpreters is that Innis never defined 
what constituted a medium. Robert Babe suggests a resolution to this challenge:  
 
Media for Innis . . . are what comes between humans to enable and affect (or bias) 
their interactions . . . In [Innis’] view whatever orients people towards the past 
and the future, or conversely induces them to disregard the past and future, is a 
medium of communication. 
 (Babe, 2008: 11-14)  
 
This definition permits law to comfortably sit as a medium, yet Frost’s deft combination of 
precision and flexibility also beckons, for Innis “a new medium is that which employs a new 
material, tool, or process. Changes in these factors therefore imply important changes for 
communications, knowledge, and ultimately civilization” (Frost, 2003: 11). If this suggests that 
Innis was strictly a material man, Frost does not leave the matter here. “In the end, Innis was 
most concerned with the potential for a new medium to effect changes at a broad civilizational 
level” (Ibid: 12).  
Therefore, if a medium is that where changes therein imply changes for communications, 
knowledge, and civilization, then copyright law, a law intended to further knowledge and retain 
civility by stipulating terms of communication, is well suited to assume the persona of a medium 
and well poised for examination through Innis’ methodology. A methodology which Frost shows 
as being much more than a bland assessment of structural characteristics:  
 
First, [Innis] was attentive to the pre-existing geographic and cultural conditions 
in which a new medium arose and was adopted; second, he detailed the economic 
and technological features associated with the medium itself; and third, he was 
concerned with a medium’s potential to influence content and to foster new social 
and economic monopolies down the line. 
 (Ibid: 11)  
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Frost’s work invites application; she sets a specific framework for exploration via Innis’ method. 
This paper continues with excerpts from a complete Innisian analysis of copyright in Canada 
(Nair, 2009), guided by what should rightly be known as Frost’s Innis-algorithm.  
 
The Construction of Copyright: Competing Ideologies 
 
If one attempts the middling step of the algorithm, the first hurdle to overcome is to identify “the 
economic and technological characteristics” associated to the statute. These characteristics of 
copyright law are found through its structure and language. How is the law designed to ascribe 
intellectual property rights? What is the underlying intention of recognition of intellectual 
property rights? And, in the context of that intention, how is language utilized to shape relations 
between affected parties? To set and interpret copyright law, parliamentarians and jurists could 
be led by the principle intentions of the statute. The tenor of the nation’s legal tradition itself may 
also offer some guidance. Canadian copyright law presents a challenge; it has no stipulated 
intention nor does it have a solitary legal tradition. 
The granting of copyright as an area of federal supervision came via the British North 
America Act (1867), where copyright was simply listed as one of twenty-nine federal 
responsibilities (Whyte & Lederman, 1977). Canada’s first independent legislation, the 
Copyright Act of 1921, was modeled in the Anglo-American tradition, but with a noticeable 
difference. The title of the first English copyright law, read as, “An Act for the Encouragement 
of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such 
Copies during the Times therein mentioned” (Talmo, 2009) and the United States Constitution 
stated that Congress shall have the power, “To promote the Progress of Science and the Useful 
Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries” (United States, 2009). Despite these blueprints, Canadian 
law contains no specified purpose for copyright. But this omission is not to be lamented. It is to 
Canadian advantage that a goal of copyright was not fixed in text. There is greater potential for 
the law to adjust according to the changing circumstances of creative activity and creative flow. 
Without an overarching principle, one must look elsewhere for the cultural ambience 
surrounding copyright in Canada. The titles of our Act provide a clue: Loi sur le Droit D’Auteur 
and  Copyright Act illustrate two differing conceptions supporting the protection of creative 
effort. French civil law founds intellectual property as a natural right. Anglo-American common 
law is inclined towards a utilitarian justification for intellectual property rights. Canadian law 
draws on both. While the two regimes are often held in opposition, neither regime operated with 
exclusively one party in mind. 
Through examining the development of copyright in France and the United States, it 
becomes apparent that the two systems were not substantially divergent in their infancy, and, in 
their maturity, again show signs of similarity. Of note are the works of Gillian Davies (1994), 
Jane Ginsburg (1994), and Carla Hesse (2002). The development of the law in both countries 
reveals that cultural endeavor proliferated during periods of lesser attention to intellectual 
property rights. Both nations strengthened intellectual property protection only after they had 
accrued an internationally desirably portfolio of works. And, each had their moments of 
discontinuity between their principled stance on copyright and its execution. The first incarnation 
of a French copyright law was in aid of reducing a monopoly in the theatre industry; authors did 
not enjoy broad security in French law until 1957 (Davies, 1994: 78-79). And, although the 
United States’ constitutional language suggests the intention of copyright was public benefit, the Meera Nair  30
private rights enacted within United States’ law steadily expanded throughout the twentieth 
century with a commensurate decrease in public access (Hesse, 2002: 42). The early overlap of 
public interest within both systems, together with their later emphasis upon private rights, 
indicates that the practice and interpretation of copyright law is more subjective than an 
ideological perspective alone would dictate. 
Canada’s commitment to diversity and multiculturalism leaves this nation better 
positioned than most to find accommodation between differing perspectives. The duality of our 
legal ancestry is to our benefit; although this was not always seen to be the case and the 
partnership continues to be an uneven one. In 1980, an often-quoted directive from the judiciary 
instructed that matters of copyright dispute should be resolved without assuming a conclusion as 
dictated by common law or civil law principles:  
 
[Copyright] neither cuts across existing rights in property or conduct nor falls 
between rights and obligations heretofore existing in the common law. Copyright 
legislation simply creates rights and obligations upon the terms and in the 
circumstances set out in the statute . . . the legislation speaks for itself and the 
actions of the appellant must be measured according to the statute. 
 (Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., 1980)  
 
The pragmatism offered here may have eased the challenges felt by subsequent judiciaries, but 
left Canadians poorer with respect to developing a cultural understanding of their law. 
Fortunately, Canadian legal discourse is showing a greater awareness of its dual heritage 
(Tawfik, 2003: 60). The Supreme Court of Canada also explicitly, and implicitly, brought into 
focus the differing legal foundations of copyright in Canada, via Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du 
Petit Champlain Inc. (2002) and Robertson v. Thomson (2006). Yet commentary continues to 
emphasize that these decisions split along cultural lines (Sheffer, 2006: 2-3). More could, and 
should, be made of the fact that there was both agreement and productive disagreement between 
the majority and minority opinions. Briefly, in 2002 came a tipping point in judicial treatment of 
copyright in Canada, opening the door to the idea that copyright is not only an individual right 
but part and parcel of a system; in 2006 came the cogent reminder that works must conform to 
the exigencies of the Copyright Act (including observance of the statutory limitations inherent to 
the grant of copyright).  
Canada’s position on the margins, as a bijural nation, offers an ideal setting in which to 
situate Innis’ writings. The means by which we mediate between our differing traditions should 
produce a cultural environment hospitable to creativity. In contrast to the instructions quoted 
above, drawing from Innis suggests that matters of copyright are best resolved by considering the 
interaction between both legal traditions. Where social utility meets with natural rights is in the 
belief that creativity itself is valued. Otherwise, the underlying purpose of copyright in either 
tradition becomes meaningless, raising the question of why have such laws at all? Therefore, 
natural rights must apply to everyone, including past, present, and future creators. Likewise, 
consideration of societal benefit must ensure that future creative processes are not stifled by the 
system purporting to encourage creative effort. 
Returning now to Babe’s definition of medium, the concern over the past and future 
seems tailor-made for closer examination of copyright. Using Innis’ simple, but enduring, 
framework of time and space, if the two elements function cooperatively, there ought to be an 
attendant benefit for creativity:  Copyright and Ethics: An Innisian Exploration  31
 
I have attempted to show elsewhere that in Western civilization a stable society is 
dependent upon an appreciation of a proper balance between the concepts of 
space and time. . . . [In] attempting a balance between the demands of time and 
space we can develop conditions favourable to an interest in cultural activity. 
 (Innis, 2003c: 64-90)  
 
Time maintains the cultural heritage, while space holds stagnation at bay and emphasizes 
innovation. Time is inclined towards the community; space leans towards the individual. As one 
would expect with any rule of law, the rights of individuals and individual rights are equally 
implicated in the construction of copyright law. The Copyright Act offers a particular challenge 
to parliamentarian and jurist alike in that creators straddle both positions in the exercise of their 
creative endeavours. A necessary first step is to identify where time and space show themselves 
in the Copyright Act.  
 
Time and Space 
 
Time and Money 
 
We have a ready hint with which to identify copyright’s spatial component: “Innis understood 
money, or the price system, to be a space-biased mode of communication par excellence” (Babe, 
2000: 76; emphasis is in original). Part I of the Copyright Act, titled Copyright and Moral Rights 
in Works, includes Section 3.1 which delineates the range of control available to copyright 
holders of original works: 
 
3. (1) For the purposes of this Act, “copyright”, in relation to a work, means the 
sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any 
material form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in 
public or, if the work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part 
thereof, and includes the sole right 
(a) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of the work, 
(b) in the case of a dramatic work, to convert it into a novel or other non-dramatic 
work, 
(c) in the case of a novel or other non-dramatic work, or of an artistic work, to 
convert it into a dramatic work, by way of performance in public or otherwise, 
(d) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, to make any sound 
recording, cinematograph film or other contrivance by means of which the work 
may be mechanically reproduced or performed, 
(e) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, to reproduce, 
adapt and publicly present the work as a cinematographic work, 
(f) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, to communicate 
the work to the public by telecommunication, 
(g) to present at a public exhibition, for a purpose other than sale or hire, an 
artistic work created after June 7, 1988, other than a map, chart or plan, Meera Nair  32
(h) in the case of a computer program that can be reproduced in the ordinary 
course of its use, other than by a reproduction during its execution in conjunction 
with a machine, device or computer, to rent out the computer program, and 
(i) in the case of a musical work, to rent out a sound recording in which the work 
is embodied, and to authorize such acts. 
 
Innis writes, “The relative emphasis upon time or space [of a medium] will imply a bias of 
significance to the culture in which it is imbedded” (Innis, 2003a: 33). Section 3.1 suggests, and 
examining the entire Copyright Act confirms, that the structure of copyright shows a spatial bias. 
The statute is predominantly devised as an instrument of distribution, where the implication is 
exchange for remuneration. Fortunately, in true Innisian fashion, a countervailing temporal bias 
exists within this same statute. The temporal orientation is found in periphery of the distribution 
rights; the measures of moral rights and fair dealing.  
 
Moral Rights: Maintaining the Past 
 
Often described as noneconomic rights, moral rights are an acknowledgment of the intensely 
personal nature of intellectual effort. A creative work embodies an aspect of the creator’s soul; 
souls can be injured through a careless use of a work. Moral rights are more highly regarded in 
civil law countries, with France seen as the epitome of moral rights protection. Curiously though, 
in 1931, Canada became the first common law country to incorporate moral rights into statutory 
law (Handa, 2002: 372-376). This revision of the law addressed Article 6
bis of the 1928 Rome 
revisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) which 
stated: 
 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the 
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation. 
 (Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2006: 585-586)  
 
Mira Sundara Rajan, a foremost authority in this area of law, shows that the Berne 
implementation of moral rights was unduly narrow. By conjoining modification to the charge of 
harming reputation, creators must prove their reputation is being harmed in order to prevent 
modification of their work. An alternative implementation could have placed the burden of proof 
upon those manipulating the creation (Sundara Rajan, 2006: 226). In any case, as moral rights 
remain outside the enforcement mechanisms of the World Trade Organization their stature on an 
international level is diminished and they are often relegated to the sidelines of copyright 
discourse. Yet their importance transcends finance. Sundara Rajan reinforces that moral rights 
make a larger contribution to culture as a whole; they reflect social attitudes concerning 
creativity and creative work. Cultures are enhanced when we maintain a cultural heritage; 
accurate and faithful representation with identifiable authorship serves to protect the historical 
past from where all future endeavour arises. With language reminiscent of Innis, Sundara Rajan 
writes, “A cultural environment that is correctly attuned to historical fact will be more 
compatible with creativity and development” (Ibid).  Copyright and Ethics: An Innisian Exploration  33
Moral rights emphasize the importance of the relationship between the author and his or 
her work, but there exists another dimension of relationship within the creative process. As 
creativity is founded upon transformation, a measure of humility must exist across the social 
relationships affected by copyright. And this social attitude is reinforced through the exception of 
fair dealing. 
 
Fair Dealing: Looking to the Future 
 
The enumerated activities invested with the right of control are expansive, but there still remains 
a space, outside of this dominant market operation of copyright, where individuals may freely 
reproduce copyrighted material for good faith, productive purposes. This space comes into 
existence through the individual right of fair dealing. A modest measure, fair dealing is not an 
invitation to copy at will. But its importance to the Copyright Act cannot be understated; it is the 
only place within the Act (with its underlying goal of creativity) where some creative effort is 
actually supported. In Sections 29, 29.1, and 29.2 of the Copyright Act, we find: 
 
Fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study does not infringe 
copyright. 
Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe copyright if 
the following are mentioned: 
(a) the source, and 
(b) if given in the source, the name of the 
(i) author, in the case of a work, 
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance, 
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or 
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal 
Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe copyright if the 
following are mentioned: 
(a) the source, and 
(b) if given in the source, the name of the 
(i) author, in the case of a work, 
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance, 
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or 
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal. 
 
An individual wishing to utilize fair dealing is bound by three conditions: i) the usage of 
copyrighted material must fall within the enumerated tasks, ii) if the task is criticism, review, or 
news reporting, the appropriate attribution must be made, and iii) left unsaid but still necessary, 
the dealing itself must be fair. Undefined in the Copyright Act, the meaning of “fair” is 
determined by the particularities of each situation.  
In 2004, through what has come to be known as CCH Canadian, a unanimous Supreme 
Court of Canada held that fair dealing was integral to the mandate of copyright, “to maintain the 
proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, [fair dealing] must 
not be interpreted restrictively” (CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004). This 
case concerned a number of issues, including a library’s practice of preparing copies of 
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astute guidance against which requests of reproduction were considered. After a comprehensive 
examination by the Supreme Court Justices, the library’s actions were accepted as fair dealing. 
The decision included some memorable words:  
 
As an integral part of the scheme of copyright law, the s. 29 fair dealing exception 
is always available. . . . Research should be given a large and liberal interpretation 
. . . and is not limited to private or noncommercial contexts. . . . It is impossible to 
define fair dealing, it must be a question of degree. 
 (Ibid)  
 
Aware of the challenge the last remark poses, our High Court presented Canadians with a six-
step framework to guide decisions of fair dealing:  
 
The purpose of the dealing, the character of the dealing, the amount of the 
dealing, the nature of the work, available alternatives to the dealing and the effect 
of the dealing on the work are all factors that could help determine whether or not 
a dealing is fair. 
 (Ibid)  
 
Notably, the framework was preceded by a caveat; “It may be relevant to consider the custom or 
practice in a particular trade or industry to determine whether or not the character of the dealing 
is fair” (CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004). The details of the guidance 
have been well documented (Craig, 2005; Murray & Trosow, 2007; Scassa, 2004); what is 
pertinent here is the flexibility of the framework. Together with the reference to customs and 
practices, it brings to mind Innis’ desire to maintain the flexibility of custom to mitigate the 
rigidity of law.  
If, as Noble writes, “Innis associates liberty with cultural traditions and historically 
evolved institutions for reasons other than epistemological skepticism or reverence for traditional 
wisdom” (Noble, 1999: 34), then placing the clarity of code within the context of historically 
derived custom, ensures a system of copyright governance which remains flexible and checks 
inclination to stagnation and dogma. Arguably, the outcome of CCH Canadian reflects this 
melding of legal traditions. But, as Innis was aware, a medium cannot solely dictate a cultural 
outcome. Outcomes are a consequence of a multitude of factors, including the manner by which 
prevailing interests utilize, or obscure, the medium. Such has been the case in the wake of CCH 
Canadian. 
Despite the considered approach to fair dealing by the Supreme Court, the nuances of the 
decision were quickly forgotten. Instead, CCH Canadian was invoked to fuel the acrimony that 
already exists between creators and the public. Owners’ rights representatives as well as 
Canadian bureaucrats actively sought to frame CCH Canadian as antithetical to creators with 
Canadian educational institutions distancing themselves from the decision (Murray, 2004; Nair, 
2006). It was not until December 2008 that an educational body actively supported the decision 
and encouraged fair dealing in Canadian academia (Fair dealing, 2008). Given that measures 
which ensure a legitimate exercise of fair dealing are already part and parcel of approved 
scholarly behaviour, the reticence of the larger academic community is disturbing. Academic 
endeavour routinely involves private study, research, criticism, and review. The attribution 
requirements are met through the practice of citation. And, particularly with respect to research, Copyright and Ethics: An Innisian Exploration  35
the appropriateness of reproduction of copyrighted material is adjudicated through a community 
of peers found via supervisory committees, editors, and peer-reviewers. Given that the Supreme 
Court Justices noted the relevance of a customs and practices upon a decision of fair dealing, fair 
dealing’s legitimacy within academia rests upon academic engagement. 
Apart from the broader constituency of Canadians as a whole, the academic community is 
the largest stakeholder in Canada which thrives on fair dealing. Students, teachers, researchers, 
and administrators all implicitly rely upon this exception. However, the singular benefit is not 
that of the modest provision of reproduction of copyrighted material, but is the attention fair 
dealing brings upon the ethical duty shared by all creators, past, present and future. It is a truism 
that creativity is collaborative; implicitly, or explicitly, when we create, we borrow from others. 
For creativity to continue, the cycle of unfettered borrowing must also continue. Fair dealing 
reminds each creator of the debt they carry; a debt that can only be paid forward. Fair dealing is 
in fact, a fair duty.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper is not an attempt to infer what Harold Adams Innis might have said of copyright law. 
It interprets the contemporary environment of copyright, through Innis’ ethical position, shaped 
as that was by his life experiences and expressed through his scholarship. Innis does not make 
this easy. Since he lived in a time when loyalties were expressed to King and Country, in that 
order, Innis’ esteem of the peripheral individual was hidden within his essays. He sought to 
convey a message without openly articulating his stance: that the individual stood ahead of the 
Empire.
6
The parallel to the dialogue of copyright is striking. The belief that copyright is a grant of 
absolute control is so deeply entrenched that to speak otherwise earns one distrust and derision. 
This mistaken belief, and the attendant behaviour that follows, is expanding the sphere of 
copyright’s control without any Parliamentary alteration to the law. Copyright is fast becoming 
an empire unto itself. However, if we pay heed to Innis’ thoughts, and attend to its margins, the 
empire need not function to our detriment. The realms of moral rights and fair dealing sustain 
ethical behaviour via maintaining social relationships across the creative process. Yet, as Innis 
emphasized with other media, complete use of the law is determined by the relative strengths of 
interested parties. 
Innis’ writings are timeless, only the invocation of his work changes. Applying his logic 
to the medium of copyright law could soothe digitally-invoked angst. Innis’ quest to secure 
creative liberty appears within copyright’s perennial challenge to find balance between the rights 
of the creator and the rights of the public. Balance is a highly contested word, with little 
agreement as to what it is and how to find it. Following Innis does not decisively answer either 
question, but provides a means by which to gauge any shifts in the allocation of rights. The 
structure of the law conveniently falls into spatial and temporal delineation; if either is removed, 
balance will suffer. 
Innis’ interest in legal development also surfaces in an analysis of copyright. He saw the 
merit of diversity in legal heritage; here lay an opportunity for creative betterment. Fair dealing, 
a site of intersection between civil and common law protection of creative effort, provides a 
realm of creative liberty set apart from the region of control. Yet fair dealing is losing ground in 
Canadian education (Nair, 2009). The challenge for Canadian education is to encourage students 
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copy without restriction. The analysis required for a decision of fair dealing ensures that all 
parties are cognizant of their rights and duties under the Copyright Act. To take shelter behind an 
institutional copyright exemption, or blindly enter into a license agreement for copying, means 
nascent creators will continue to lose sight of the debt they owe to their predecessors. The 
perception of creativity will remain that of individual undertaking, and copyright will continue to 
function as a means of absolute control. As Innis said, “the law is apt to become anything boldly 
stated and plausibly maintained” (Innis, 2004: 52). 
 
 
Notes 
 
*  The author would like to thank the editors and the reviewers for their assessment and 
constructive remarks of this paper. Additionally, her thanks go to Dr. Roman 
Onufrijchuk, who was her first guide across the intellectual landscape created by Harold 
Adams Innis. 
1  Copyright makes occasional appearances throughout Innis’ writings: “American authors 
with lack of copyright protection turned to journalism. . . . Publishers demand great 
names and great books if no copyright is involved” (Innis, 2003b: 28-29); “the absence of 
copyright [meant] large scale piracy of English books in the United States, and a smaller-
scale piracy of American ones in England” (Innis, 1946: 53); “Emerson reported the 
remark of an Englishman: As long as you do not grant us copyright, we shall have the 
teaching of you” (Innis, 2003d: 171).  
2  Alexander Watson filed his Ph.D. dissertation, Marginal Man: Harold Innis’ 
Communications Works in Context (1981). Watson aptly notes that unless we understand 
the context of Innis’ work, we shall never understand the content. Updated to address the 
Innisian scholarship that ensued in the intervening twenty-five years, University of 
Toronto Press published Marginal Man—The Dark Vision of Harold Innis (2006). 
Watson’s work remains the most comprehensive source regarding Innis’ work and life.  
3  Two compendiums of papers, Harold Innis in the New Century (1999) and Culture, 
Communication, and Dependency (1981) illustrate the range of Innisian scholarship.  
4  While the title suggests a historical account of the law, the essay appears largely to 
describe mundane legal practices, United States imperialism, and their combined effect 
upon Canada. Innis’ sequence of historical and contemporary information is erratic in 
chronology. With careful study though, Innis’ pointillist effort yields a broader 
perspective. He illustrates areas of intersection between Roman law (the praecursor to 
civil law) and common law, the subsequent reshaping of the actors involved, and the 
consequent effect upon the world at large.  
5  The elements of reason and emotion keep appearing in Innis’ writings; This Has Killed 
That (1977), Political Economy in the Modern State (1944), A Plea for the University 
Tradition (1944).  
6  One instance of unequivocal language lies in the Preliminary Draft of a World 
Constitution. Composed by Innis and several American scholars, it agrees that, “[T]he 
advancement of man in spiritual excellence and physical welfare is a common goal of 
mankind” (Hutchins et al., 1948: 3).  Copyright and Ethics: An Innisian Exploration  37
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